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Main Page Commonwealth v. Mullen
(Click here to view the original thread on the MassCops Message Board)

Posted by: CampusOfficer

Anyone have the full text of the Commonwealth v. Mullen case out of Fitchburg which involves campus police stopping a motor vehicle for a civil motor vehicle infraction. I tried google and a few search engines, and couldn't find it. If you have it could you please send it to me in a PM please. Thank you.

Posted by: MPDReserve

If you don't get any responses, you will be able to find it in a law library. Most courts have them, or law schools. If you have trouble locating one yourself, PM me.

Posted by: quality617

I have that in a Word doc, but I don't know how to attach it in a PM.

PM me your email, and I'll send it off if you haven't already found it.

Posted by: mpd61

Before you immerse yourself in it remember;

a. It's a case that should have been followed-up by the D.A. because back then, they were only looking at CH22c powers and the fact that the Fitchburg State Officer wasn't issued a ticket book. They never cited CH73/s.18 and CH15A/s22 powers.

b. theres been more recent case law and legislation (2162)that makes the case MOOT!

But it does make for interesting reading, knock yourself out!

Posted by: 94c

Commonwealth v. Mullen, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 404 (1996)

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.
No. 94‑P‑1974.
Argued October 6, 1995.
Decided May 6, 1996.
Further Appellate Review Denied July 25, 1996.

William E. Loughlin, Assistant District Attorney, for Commonwealth.

Harry D. Quick, III, Worchester, for defendant.

Before PERRETTA, GILLERMAN and LENK, JJ.

LENK, Justice.

The Commonwealth brings this interlocutory appeal from an order of a District Court judge suppressing evidence stemming from the defendant's warrantless arrest for three motor vehicle offenses on November 18, 1993, on North Street, a public way adjacent to the campus of Fitchburg [40 Mass.App.Ct. 405] State College. (FN1) The arresting officer was employed by the college as a special State police officer who was purportedly acting pursuant to G.L. c. 22C, § 63, inserted by St.1991, c. 412, § 22. The statute grants such officers "the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college." The Commonwealth contends that the statute empowered the officer to arrest the defendant for operating under the influence of liquor on part of a public way that was within the confines of the college campus. For the reasons herein stated, we affirm the order of the judge allowing the motion to suppress.

We summarize the findings of the motion judge, supplemented in significant respects with uncontroverted testimony adduced at the hearing on the motion. On November 18, 1993, at about 2:10 A.M., Robert Harrington, a campus police officer at Fitchburg State College, was proceeding in a southerly direction on North Street, a public way maintained by the town of Fitchburg. Part of his duty was to patrol North Street. Harrington observed a red Ford Escort automobile pull out of Authority Drive, a private way maintained by the college, heading in an easterly direction. Framing the intersection of North Street and Authority Drive are certain college buildings, including the Hammond Library building and two residential towers. Students commonly walk up and down North Street and cross the street there. Harrington stated that there are no traffic control devices at the intersection. When Harrington's cruiser was almost to the point of the exit area, the Escort came out of Authority Drive at an angle to the right, and Harrington was forced to swerve into the left lane (the opposite travel lane) to avoid being hit. The Escort ended up in Harrington's lane. Harrington activated his blue lights; the Escort backed up onto Authority Drive and he backed up next to the Escort. The motion judge found that "[t]he officer thereafter stopped the defendant on North Street and arrested the defendant for OUI and the defendant was also charged with [two] civil motor vehicle infractions." [40 Mass.App.Ct. 406] When asked on cross‑examination what he stopped the defendant for, Harrington replied that he stopped the defendant for failure to yield at an intersection. (FN2), (FN3)

Without citing to any authorities or explaining his analysis, the motion judge in granting the defendant's motion to suppress concluded as matter of law only that "[t]he Fitchburg State College employee lacked legal authority to do those things which were done." The parties at the motion hearingand on appeal focus their attention on a question of statutory construction, viz., whether North Street was "owned used or occupied" by Fitchburg State College, so as to permit Harrington to make arrests for any criminal offense committed thereon. It is not necessary to reach the issue framed by the parties.

[1] Harrington stopped the defendant for failure to yield at an intersection, a civil motor vehicle infraction punishable only by a thirty‑five dollar fine. G.L. c. 89, § 8, as amended through St.1991, c. 552, §§ 64, 65. See Cambridge v. Phillips, 415 Mass. 126, 128, 612 N.E.2d 638 (1993). It is not an arrestable offense. St.1988, c. 202, § 28. (FN4) See and compare Commonwealth v. Zorrilla, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 77, 79, 645 N.E.2d 48 (1995). At the time he stopped the defendant, Harrington did not have reason to suspect that the defendant had committed an arrestable offense. It was only after the officer stopped the defendant and made observations concerning his sobriety that Harrington [40 Mass.App.Ct. 407] discovered grounds to arrest the defendant for the arrestable offense of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol. If Harrington had the authority to stop the defendant in the first instance, the validity of the defendant's subsequent arrest based on probable cause discovered to exist after the stop is not thereby put in question, Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 Mass. 277, 278‑279, 317 N.E.2d 480 (1974), and the issue framed by the parties would then be pertinent. As it is, however, we conclude that Harrington did not have authority to stop the defendant for a civil motor vehicle violation and, accordingly, the subsequent warrantless arrest cannot be justified by observations made following the stop. It is, therefore, of no consequence to our analysis that North Street may be "owned, used or occupied" by Fitchburg State College.

General Laws c. 22C, § 63, does not confer upon campus security staff all the powers of a State police officer appointed pursuant to c. 22C, § 10. On its face, G.L. c. 22C, § 63, confers upon those appointed thereunder by the colonel of the Massachusetts State police as special State police officers only "the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures owned, used or occupied by such college." The police powers thus conferred upon certain college employees are similar, but by no means identical, to the specific police powers conferred by c. 22C, §§ 56‑68, upon certain agents or employees of: the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, (FN5) various humane societies and associations, (FN6) the Port of Boston Authority, (FN7) the Department of Mental Health or Department of Mental Retardation, (FN

the [40 Mass.App.Ct. 408] Department of Public Health, (FN9) the Massachusetts Turnpike Authority, (FN10)various soldiers' homes, (FN11) the Civil Defense Agency, (FN12) the Middlesex County Sanatorium, (FN13) the Department of Employment and Training, (FN14) the State Lottery Commission (FN15) and the Bureau of Special Investigations. (FN16) The statutory provisions of c. 22C, §§ 56 through 68, are all silent as to the authority, if any, of special State police officers appointed thereunder to enforce the civil motor vehicle laws on public ways within their respective jurisdictions.

General Laws c. 90C details the procedures to be employed with regard to motor vehicle offenses. It is c. 90C, § 2, as [40 Mass.App.Ct. 409] inserted by St.1985, c. 794, § 3, which authorizes a police officer to stop a motorist in order to issue a citation for automobile law violations. This section provides inter alia that "any police officer assigned to traffic enforcement duty" shall record the violation upon a citation. Section 3, as amended by St.1992, c. 379, §§ 5, 5A, provides that "If a police officer observes ... the occurrence of a civil motor vehicle infraction, the officer may issue a written warning or may cite the violator for a civil motor vehicle infraction...." To do so, the police officer must, of course, in many instances first stop the offender. However, c. 90C, § 1, as amended through St.1991, c. 412, § 64, defines "police officer" narrowly to include "any officer ... authorized to make arrest or serve criminal process, any person appointed by the registrar under section twenty‑nine of chapter ninety, any person appointed by the trustees of the University of Massachusetts under section thirty‑two A of chapter seventy‑five, any person appointed by the trustees of Southeastern Massachusetts university under section seventeen of chapter seventy‑five B and any person appointed by the colonel of state police under section fifty‑nine of chapter twenty‑two C."

[2] While virtually all special State police officers are empowered by c. 22C, §§ 56 through 68, to "make arrest" and/or "serve criminal process," we do not read c. 90, § 1, to encompass all such special State police officers within the definition of "police officer." Were this so, it would have been redundant and unnecessary for c. 90, § 1, expressly to include within the definition of "police officer" only those special State police officers appointed under c. 22C, § 59. Accordingly, we conclude that campus police officers, unlike those employed by the Departments of Mental Health or Mental Retardation under c. 226, § 59, are not empowered under c. 90C, § 2, to stop motorists for automobile law violations on public wayswithin their jurisdiction. (FN17) Consistent with the foregoing, the motion judge specifically found that Officer Harrington "had no citation book and the [d]efendant did not receive any motor vehicle citations."

[40 Mass.App.Ct. 410] As the acknowledged basis for the stop by the officer was a civil motor vehicle violation which was not an arrestable offense, the evidence relating to the subsequent complaint for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol was properly suppressed in circumstances where the officer did not suspect that the defendant had committed an arrestable offense prior to the stop. See Commonwealth v. Zorrilla, 38 Mass.App.Ct. at 78‑81, 645 N.E.2d 48 (warrantless search and seizure of a motor vehicle unlawful where basis for the police stop was a nonarrestable civil offense). The order of the judge allowing the defendant's motion to suppress is therefore affirmed.

So ordered.
(FN1.) Complaints issued against the defendant for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol (G.L. c. 90, § 24), operating a motor vehicle without license in possession (G.L. c. 90, § 11), and failure to yield at an intersection (G.L. c. 89, §

, the latter two complaints being civil infractions.

(FN2.) There was no testimony at the suppression hearing concerning the citation of the defendant for operating under the influence of alcohol.

(FN3.) The judge read the complaint into the record. The complaint recites that the defendant "did operate a motor vehicle on a way as defined in G.L. c. 90, § 1, and while turning left in an intersection of ways, across the path of a vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, did fail, before turning, to yield the right‑of‑way until such time as the left turn could be made with reasonable safety, in violation of G.L. c. 89, § 8." Presumably based on Harrington's testimony on cross‑examination that the Escort pulled out of Authority Drive at a right angle, the judge specifically found that the defendant was "not making a left turn as set forth" in the complaint.

(FN4.) Indeed, as the defendant suggests here, it appears that the judge may have in fact determined that the failure to yield infraction may not have occurred at all, for the reason that the defendant was not making a left turn. See Commonwealth v. Zorrilla, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 77, 79 n. 4, 645 N.E.2d 48 (1995). General Laws c. 89, § 8, provides that an operator "intending to turn left ... [must] yield the right‑of‑way." The judge found that the defendant was not making a left turn.

(FN5.) Chapter 22C, § 56: "[A]gents ... shall have and exercise throughout the commonwealth the powers of state police officers to serve warrants and other criminal processes, except the authority to arrest without warrant."

(FN6.) Chapter 22C, § 57: "They ... shall have throughout the commonwealth the powers of constables and police officers to arrest and detain any person violating any law for the prevention of cruelty to animals."

(FN7.) Chapter 22C, § 58: "[T]hey shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands, piers or structures within the charge of said authority."

(FN8.) Chapter 22C, § 59: "[E]mployees ... shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures within the charge of said departments or of the various institutions under the respective jurisdictions of said departments."

(FN9.) Chapter 22C, § 60: "[E]mployees ... shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in or upon the lands or structures within the charge of the department of public health or the various institutions under its jurisdiction."

(FN10.) Chapter 22C, § 61: "[T]hey shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures within the control of said authority."

(FN11.) Chapter 22C, § 62: "[E]mployees ... shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in or upon land or structures within the charge of said boards of trustees...."

(FN12.) Chapter 22C, § 64: "[E]mployees ... shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police of any criminal offense committed in or upon lands or structures located in the town of Framingham within the charge of said director."

(FN13.) Chapter 22C, § 65: "[E]mployees ... shall have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense committed in or upon lands, or structures owned, used or occupied by said sanatorium."

(FN14.) Chapter 22C, § 66: "[T]hey shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any violation of section forty‑seven of chapter one hundred and fifty‑one A and shall have the power to serve warrants and other criminal processes."

(FN15.) Chapter 22C, § 67: "[T]hey shall have the same power to make arrests as the state police for any criminal offense committed in connection with any activities operated or regulated by the state lottery commission."

(FN16.) Chapter 22, § 68: "[T]hey shall have and exercise throughout the commonwealth the same powers as state police officers to serve warrants and other criminal processes for any criminal offense resulting from either a fraudulent claim for payment or service under any assistance program administered by the department of public welfare or any program administered by the department of social services or a receipt of payment or services by a person entitled thereto or for any violation of chapter two hundred and seventy‑three relative to the support of spouses and children for whom the department of public welfare is entitled to receive payment, or in whose behalf said department is giving aid; except, that said officers shall not have the authority to arrest without a warrant."

(FN17.) Since at least 1961, prior to the enactment of both c. 22C,§ 59, and c. 90C, § 1, special police officers appointed under c. 147, § 10B, and employed by the Department of Mental Health have enforced regulations relative to controlling motor vehicle traffic on the grounds of State hospitals. Opinion of the Attorney General, Rep. A.G, P.D. No. 12 at 115, 117 (1962).

Posted by: RPD931

Uh oh... CampusOfficer is on "The Prowl"...

Posted by: CampusOfficer

Now, now...take it easy. Just trying to prove a point to a few "misinformed" co-workers.

Posted by: sgt128-13

Quote:

Originally Posted by mpd61

b. theres been more recent case law and legislation (2162)that makes the case MOOT!

Which legislation and case law is 2162? I'm not sure that would make Mullen moot for private colleges though.

Posted by: Inspector71

Quote:

Originally Posted by sgt128-13

Which legislation and case law is 2162? I'm not sure that would make Mullen moot for private colleges though.

2162 is the Bill that passed in the summer of 05' that clarified that State and Community college police were defined as "Police Officers" and "Chiefs" under CH90c1. They allready had powers and were issuing cites for Chapter 90 forever. The registry got all in a hissy and stopped giving out books to these state schools. The bill fixed that.

Commonwealth v. Baez and other case laws subsequently caused a lot of debate.

Posted by: sidge99

what brought this up?

Posted by: sgt128-13

Quote:

Originally Posted by Inspector71

Bah... like I said, no changes for private colleges under 22C/S63 so we still have to go by Mullen.

Posted by: BartA1

Actually the bill that gave state and community colleges the ability to get ticket books again from the RMV was 2132. It started out as H775 and H776 then somewhere was assigned 2132. Originally a one paragraph bill it turned into a two page document requiring the state and community colleges to jump through a few more paperwork hurdles to get Uniform Traffic Citations.

As far as Mullen goes my opinion is it should have been appealed and not just left in limbo

Posted by: Slimer

Quote:

Originally Posted by BartA1

As far as Mullen goes my opinion is it should have been appealed and not just left in limbo

Correct Mr. A, that's why there is always argument about it...

Posted by: NEPS

Nothing I have seen in statutory or case law has undermined the basic rule of Comm. v. Mullen: Section 63 officers at private colleges do not have the authority to stop violators for civil motor vehicle infractions because they are not authorized to issue citations for civil motor vehicle infractions.

Perhaps the decision ought to have been appealed. The court made an error in citing the MGL (see the quoted section below):

Quote:

Originally Posted by 94c

[2] While virtually all special State police officers are empowered by c. 22C, §§ 56 through 68, to "make arrest" and/or "serve criminal process," we do not read c. 90, § 1, to encompass all such special State police officers within the definition of "police officer." Were this so, it would have been redundant and unnecessary for c. 90, § 1, expressly to include within the definition of "police officer" only those special State police officers appointed under c. 22C, § 59. Accordingly, we conclude that campus police officers, unlike those employed by the Departments of Mental Health or Mental Retardation under c. 226, § 59, are not empowered under c. 90C, § 2, to stop motorists for automobile law violations on public wayswithin their jurisdiction. (FN17) Consistent with the foregoing, the motion judge specifically found that Officer Harrington "had no citation book and the [d]efendant did not receive any motor vehicle citations."

In the that definition c. 90, s. 1 provides for "police officer", SSPOs appointed to the DMH or DMR are not mentioned at all. The following is the actual language from c, 90, s. 1:

“Police officer” or “officer”, any constable or other officer authorized to make arrest or serve process, provided he is in uniform or displays his badge of office.

It is c. 90C, s. 1 that has a definition of "police chief" that mentions DMR and DMH. I can't remember if, at the time of Mullen, the definition of "police officer" in Chapter 90C mentioned DMH and DMR. It does not currently.

The Mullen court may have confused the two separate definitions of police officer found in these two chapters. Or the court may have made a scrivener's error and wrote "c. 90, s. 1" when it meant "c. 90C, s. 1." At any rate, the error in citation would have been a basis to have the decision reconsidered by the Appeals Court or taken to the SJC. Even now the citation error would be a basis for arguing that Mullen was wrongly decided.

But Mullen does not mean that private s. 63 officers may not stop cars on suspicion that occupants have committed a crime. In my opinion, private s. 63 officers, within their jurisdictions, are even entitled to make stops and arrests for the arrestable offenses in c. 90, such as OUI or use without authority or driving to endanger. I believe this to be true because:

(1) C. 90 defines police officer very broadly. A "constable or other officer authorized to make arrests" would seem to apply to officers who "shall have the same power to make arrests as regular police officers for any criminal offense," c. 22C, s. 63. The authority to make arrests comes from section 21 in Chapter 90 (and, for breaches of the peace, from the common law, see Comm. v. Howe), not from Chapter 90C, which regulates the use of citations.

(2) Arrests for criminal motor vehicle violations do not require citations, according to a number of appellate decisions (none of which I have handy) because an arrest fulfills the needs addressed by a citation: prompt notice of the offense and avoidance of corrupt manipulation of prosecutions for motor vehicle offenses.

(3) Further, c. 90C, s. 4 says:

Nothing in this chapter shall prevent a person other than a police officer from applying for a criminal complaint for an offense that constitutes a criminal automobile law violation under subsection (B) of section three of this chapter, and such person need not show that the violator has been issued a citation in connection with such violation.

If, as Mullen may say, a private s. 63 officer is not a police officer under the definition found in Chapter 90C, then such an officer must be "a person other than a police officer" who may apply for a criminal complaint without a citation. But because a s. 63 officer is a police officer under c. 90, then the officer should be able to make an arrest, bring it to court, and apply for a criminal complaint.

The trouble comes in trying to convince the court clerk's office that a MV arrest does not require an accompanying citation. With some work, this could be done iby an agency willing to commit to it.

To any agency that might be interested, I teach legal update especially tailored to college and university police and I cover the authority and jurisdiction of campus police officers. Please PM me if you would like to learn more.

Posted by: Macop

Private colleges have nothing to do with this. We all know that they cannot enforce Ch 90 unless its a criminal offense. And of course if they are specials in thier respective cities or towns that the college is in. But I feel that the updated law that defines State institutions as Police Officers for Ch 90 purposes should include private colleges or rewrite 22/63 to give Ch 90 powers. I'll never understand why the most mundance task is L.E is somehow a protected treasure.

Posted by: mpd61

Quote:

Originally Posted by Macop

Private colleges have nothing to do with this. But I feel that the updated law that defines State institutions as Police Officers for Ch 90 purposes should include private colleges or rewrite 22/63 to give Ch 90 powers. .

Aaronski,

Valid point as usual, but, the State institutions are already "police officers" under 73/s18 and 15A/s22 and now referenced as same in 90C/s1.

Those private colleges under 22C/s63, as you are well aware, are under the authority of our French blue buddies, and their CMRs. Now knowing SPAM and the Colonel as we do, can you see them suggesting to their friends in the legislature that they rewrite 22C/s63 to ahh... "expand" the private college police powers to include (gulp!) the coveted holy grail of CHAPTER 90!!!!!!!!??
Have you been working a lot of OT lately?

Commonwealth v. Mullen, Commonwealth v. Howe, Commonwealth v. Baez all ended up saying different things about different agencies at different times which ultimately leads to continuous arm chair lawyers in LAPD blue arguing this crap forever.

Posted by: new guy

Quote:

Originally Posted by Macop

Private colleges have nothing to do with this. We all know that they cannot enforce Ch 90 unless its a criminal offense. And of course if they are specials in thier respective cities or towns that the college is in. But I feel that the updated law that defines State institutions as Police Officers for Ch 90 purposes should include private colleges or rewrite 22/63 to give Ch 90 powers. I'll never understand why the most mundance task is L.E is somehow a protected treasure.

Excellent point, but they'll probably never change the language of 22/63 unless someone with significant political clout organizes a serious push for it.

Question:
From a legal standpoint, can state and community college PO's with valid CH 90 citation books write CH 90 citations on non campus roadways if they are sworn Deputy Sheriff's or are they still limited to campus roadways ?
I know that many of the state colleges have a lot of city roadways running through the heart of their college communities and I was wondering if they would be covered under Baez.

Posted by: sgt128-13

Quote:

Originally Posted by Macop

But I feel that the updated law that defines State institutions as Police Officers for Ch 90 purposes should include private colleges or rewrite 22/63 to give Ch 90 powers.

In order for this to happen for 22/63 officers, wouldn't the same legislative adjustments have to be made as far as 90/1? Or, would it just be easier to change 22/63 and "add in" the language that gives them C90 powers?

Posted by: PBC FL Cop

Quote:

Originally Posted by new guy

Question:
From a legal standpoint, can state and community college PO's with valid CH 90 citation books write CH 90 citations on non campus roadways if they are sworn Deputy Sheriff's or are they still limited to campus roadways ?

I know that many of the state colleges have a lot of city roadways running through the heart of their college communities and I was wondering if they would be covered under Baez.

If they are sworn deputy sheriff's they would retain all the authority of the sheriff and therefore could refer to Comm v Baez for their authority to enforce civil m/v infractions.

Posted by: Inspector71

Quote:

Originally Posted by mpd61

Commonwealth v. Mullen, Commonwealth v. Howe, Commonwealth v. Baez all ended up saying different things about different agencies at different times which ultimately leads to continuous arm chair lawyers in LAPD blue arguing this crap forever.

Looks like you are dead right dude!

Posted by: NEPS

Quote:

Originally Posted by Macop

But I feel that the updated law that defines State institutions as Police Officers for Ch 90 purposes should include private colleges or rewrite 22/63 to give Ch 90 powers. I'll never understand why the most mundance task is L.E is somehow a protected treasure.

I agree with you. As I have said elsewhere on this site:

If all of this seems needlessly confusing, that is because it is needlessly confusing. In Massachuestts the arrest authority of state troopers, municipal police officers, special officers, state special officers, deputy sheriffs, and auxiliary police officers wallows in a swamp of common law, statutory exceptions, special interests, turf battles, parochialism, elitism, and general neglect that does not serve the interests of justice or comprehensibility.

Quote:

Originally Posted by mpd61

Those private colleges under 22C/s63, as you are well aware, are under the authority of our French blue buddies, and their CMRs. Now knowing SPAM and the Colonel as we do, can you see them suggesting to their friends in the legislature that they rewrite 22C/s63 to ahh... "expand" the private college police powers to include (gulp!) the coveted holy grail of CHAPTER 90!!!!!!!!???

I don't believe it is the concern of SPAM so much as the MPA, the BPPA, and other local police unions. After all, if given citation books the private college police would not be out on the highways.

Quote:

Originally Posted by mpd61

See my quote above.

Posted by: BartA1

Correct me if I am wrong, but doesnt Half the money goe to the state and the other half goes to the town where the ticket was written? So if say private college A was in town A and private college A issues ticket town A gets half the money. That being said I cant see town A or the police union in town A really caring from a financial standpoint. The way Mass works nothing will probably change anyway.

Posted by: RPD931

Quote:

Originally Posted by CampusOfficer

Now, now...take it easy. Just trying to prove a point to a few "misinformed" co-workers.

"Misinformed"?? Here? NO!!?!?!

Posted by: csauce777

Quote:

Originally Posted by BartA1

Correct me if I am wrong, but doesnt Half the money goe to the state and the other half goes to the town where the ticket was written? So if say private college A was in town A and private college A issues ticket town A gets half the money. That being said I cant see town A or the police union in town A really caring from a financial standpoint. The way Mass works nothing will probably change anyway.

Could it be that the respective private colleges do not want their police departments stopping and citing students (current or prospective) because A) as you pointed out, they wouldnt get any proceeds, and B) it may discourage people who pay the tuition bills ie: parents? If there is no incentive for the college administration, why would they seek to expand police powers for their officers?

Just playing devils advocate...

Posted by: BartA1

csauce,

You make a good point. The problem for the private colleges seems to be when they have a criminal complaint I am under the impression that certain courts will not take the complaint without the traffic citation. Anyway as I stated before the way things go in mass this will probably never change.

Posted by: j809

All MCCPD money went back to the City of Brockton. I got the court time and the city got the cash.

Posted by: BartA1

j809

Nothing has changed. Still the same breakdown as far as state and community colleges go. I am not sure about the UMASS system.

Posted by: Macop

Could it be that the respective private colleges do not want their police departments stopping and citing students (current or prospective) because A) as you pointed out, they wouldnt get any proceeds, and B) it may discourage people who pay the tuition bills ie: parents? If there is no incentive for the college administration, why would they seek to expand police powers for their officers?

Just playing devils advocate...

Possibly, but some private colleges have full Ch 90, the ones that are sworn specials in the town/city. Although I don't know if they do much with the Ch 90 authority. J809 can answer that better.

Posted by: j809

When I worked at Babson, the academy trained guys had CH90 through Wellesley as we wore sworn in as specials in the town as well as SSPOs. When Olin College was built we got sworn in Needham as well.We had books issued by WPD and some guys used them alot and some didn't. We also had campus tickets for speeding , i believe they were $100. That is what they wanted to issue to students, anybody else that was not a student got the CH90 ticket.

Posted by: mpd61

Quote:

Originally Posted by j809

When I worked at Babson, the academy trained guys had CH90 through Wellesley as we wore sworn in as specials in the town as well as SSPOs. When Olin College was built we got sworn in Needham as well..

I drive by Wellesley/Babson/Olin a couple time a week on patrol...I ALWAYS think of you Yimmy!!!!

Posted by: Macop

Scotty hows it going out there?

Posted by: mpd61

Quote:

Originally Posted by Macop

Scotty hows it going out there?

Pretty good dude. I'd say I think of you on patrol too like j809, however, since you won't tell anyone where you work I can't say whether or not I cruise through or near your town (LMFAO)

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